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The Political Feasibility of
Increasing Retirement Age:
Lessons from a Ballot on Female Retirement Age
Abstract
In 1998, the Swiss voters approved of an increase in female retirement
age from 62 to 64. The referendum, being on a single issue only, oers a
unique opportunity to explore the political feasibility of pension reforms
and to apply theoretical models of life{cycle decision making. Estimates
carried out with municipality data suggest that the outcome of the vote
conforms relatively well with predictions drawn from a theoretical sim-
ulation study. There are, however, surprising gender dierences even in
married couples. Young agents, married middle{aged and all elderly men
favor an increase in female retirement age, while middle{aged and elderly
women strongly oppose it. Richer communities and those with a high
proportion of self{employed or a low fraction of blue{collar workers are
more likely to opt for a higher retirement age. Ideological preferences and
regional dierences also play a considerable role.
Jel{Classication: H55, D91, D72, J18




The task of eliminating scal imbalances of unfunded public pension systems is
one of the most urgent policy concerns in industrialized countries. Although the
problem is widely recognized, policy makers are reluctant to implement painful
reforms to the current systems. The reason is obvious: most living agents, and
in particular those at voting ages, will lose from cuts in their pension entitle-
ments. From an illuminating questionnaire study involving several thousand
citizens in four major European countries (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain),
Boeri, Borsch{Supan & Tabellini (2001) conclude that \a majority of the citizens
does not want to change the status quo size of pension benets, even in the light
of high current taxes and contributions".
One important reform option | an increase in retirement age | has been
ignored by almost all theoretical contributions in the area.1 This omission is
even more surprising in view of the fact that mortality rates have decreased dra-
matically in the last decades, and a delayed entry into the labor market due to
longer education periods has decreased the average contribution period. Unlike
a uniform reduction in the pension level, a nancially equivalent increase in re-
tirement age should nd some support among the retirees: At least those beyond
the targeted statutory retirement age should not oppose such a reform.
While theoretical studies on the political economy of pension reforms are
abundant, empirical evidence is very scarce.2 This is not surprising: The direct
democracy paradigm used by most theoretical contributions is largely unrealistic
for most countries, and in the few instances where there is a direct democracy
decision, it is often very diÆcult to disentangle the dierent determinants of
voting behavior.
This paper analyzes the outcome of a recent popular initiative3 concerning
1The public choice literature on pay{as{you{go (PAYG) public pension systems, as pioneered
by Aaron (1966) and Browning (1975), and summarized and extended in Persson & Tabellini
(2000), Breyer (1997) and Verbon (1990), has traditionally focused on a narrow parametric
contribution{benet trade{o, mostly neglecting retirement age as a possible parameter. In
(Butler (2000)) it is shown that, under certain circumstances, an increase in retirement age
might politically be more feasible than an increase in pension contributions (taxes), especially
if additional distortions, such as progressive income taxes, are taken into account.
2I am aware of two papers that attempt to explain the level and development of social
security with empirical observations. The rst study by Congleton & Shughart (1990) tries to
test the relevance of the median{voter model vis{a{vis the interest group model for US social
security and nd considerable support for the former. From a panel of OECD countries, Breyer
& Craig (1997) conclude that larger programs are associated with a higher median voter age,
more income heterogeneity, and a greater similarity in family size.
3Swiss citizens may seek a decision on an amendment they want to make to the constitution.
For such an initiative to be organized, the signatures of 100'000 voters (approximately two
percent of the voting population) must be collected within 18 months. While retirement is not
a particularly appropriate subject for a constitutional amendment, such additions are common
in Switzerland as popular initiatives are constraint to changes to the constitution, but not to
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female retirement age in Switzerland. The initiative's aim was to prevent female
retirement age to be increased from 62 to 64, as had been decided | as part of a
large social security reform package | in a plebiscite three years before. A 60%
majority of voters decided against the initiative, i.e., in favor of a higher female
retirement age. As can be seen in Figure 1, however, there were large regional
dierences:4 A majority of voters in French and Italian speaking cantons decided
in favor of a lower female retirement age as proposed by the initiative.
Figure 1: Outcomes of the popular initiative \No increase in female retirement
age" in 26 Swiss cantons. Dierent shades of Grey correspond, in ascending
order, to the percentage of YES votes: < 30% (= white), 30{35%, 35{40%, 40{
45%, 45{50% (dark diagonal pattern), 50{60% (dark Grey), and > 60% (black).
Although referenda on public policy issues are common in Switzerland, the
referendum stands out as a unique opportunity to explore the political economy
the law.
4The 26 cantons are the Swiss states, which enjoy a substantial autonomy in a number of
important elds such as education, tax structure, and public services. There is a large hetero-
geneity between and within cantons, in terms of size (from roughly 30'000 to more than a million
inhabitants), institutions, income distribution, and other socioeconomic characteristics. French
is spoken by a majority of citizens in the cantons of Geneva (=GE), Vaud (VD), Neuchâtel
(NE), Fribourg (FR), Valais (VS), and Jura (JU). The Ticino (TI) is Italian speaking, while
Swiss German is the main language in all other cantons.
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of pension reforms. Unlike most other votes on social security issues, the ballot
was on one dimension only and was not part of a larger package deal. The
proposal | which is explained in more details is section 2 | is clear, and it is
relatively easy to gure out how much dierent groups in the population benet
or lose from such a reform. Since a low female retirement favors middle{aged and
elderly women at the expense of men and | given the unfavorable demographics
| even young women, one would expect men, very young and elderly women
(beyond the targeted retirement age) to favor the increase.5 Pension benets are
practically the same for every retiree, whereas contributions are approximately
proportional to income. Consequently, the rich should favor an increase and
voters with a low income, high income uncertainty or high risk aversion should
oppose it. However, decision making is more complicated than that: Voters
should also take into account marital status and its expected evolution (divorce,
widowhood), and even future policy decisions.
To explore individual choices and voting decisions over the given pension
reform options, a theoretical life{cycle model is presented in section 3. Agents'
choices as a function of age and income, but also conditional on gender and
current marital status are discussed. The latter is important for understanding
the decisions of male voters: An increase in female retirement age might reduce
a married couple's future consumption possibilities, and therefore induce the
husband to oppose the reform just as much as his wife does.
Data and the used empirical strategy are discussed in section 4. Although
detailed data on approximately 2800 Swiss municipalities is available, the infor-
mation suers from aggregation problems. For example, it is possible that the
demographic life{cycle variables of interest are masked by other socioeconomic
variables, in particular income. To illustrate the importance of aggregation and
to discuss the chosen estimation strategy, an articial aggregate economy is sim-
ulated, based on household choices, as well as within and between municipality
income variability. The results from this exercise show that estimation results
have to be interpreted with care: Although all agents in the articial economy
decide rationally, life{cycle eects can be dominated | though not completely
masked | by income eects.
The empirical results are presented in section 5. Approving vote shares of the
initiative are estimated with a grouped logit model on a municipality level. A
number of socio{economic variables and the demographic distribution by age 
gender  marital status is used. Despite some data limitations, one nds support
for the predictions of the theoretical model: Young men (and young women in
5Note that for a working agent with an average mortality rate, a decrease in the benet
level (leaving retirement age unchanged) or a compensating increase in the legal retirement
age (leaving the benet level unchanged) is basically equivalent. For him, the two options only
dier in insurance aspects (which in turn depend on the availability of annuities). As soon as an
agent has reached the statutory retirement age, he is better o with an increase in retirement
age than with a decrease in the benet level.
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German speaking regions) favor an increase in female retirement age. In contrast
to middle{aged and elderly men who favor such a reform, female middle{aged
and elderly voters strongly oppose a higher retirement age. The opposition of
elderly female voters is surprising as they are not aected by the change. With
an R2 exceeding 0.8 in most estimates, the outcome of the referendum can be
well explained by a combination of socio{economic variables and demographic
factors. As in the simulated articial economy, community income is the domi-
nating economic variable in explaining the variation in vote shares. Nevertheless,
other socio{economic characteristics and ideologies are also important. Commu-
nities with an above average fraction of left{wing voters strongly oppose delaying
retirement benets. A striking feature in all estimates is the importance of lan-
guage.
The conclusions in section 6 summarize the ndings and try to draw some
conclusions for the the political feasibility of a general increase in retirement age.
2 The Swiss Social Security System and the Bal-
lot on Female Retirement Age
The Swiss social security system is composed of two pillars of approximately
equal importance. The rst pillar AHV/AVS,6 a predominantly pay{as{you{
go (PAYG) system, was introduced after a very successful referendum in 1948.
During the last 50 years, its structure has changed considerably in 10 so{called
revisions. Two of them | the minor 9th revision in 1978, and the substantial
structural 10th revision in 1995 (see below) | were unsuccessfully challenged by
a referendum. Since a large increase in the size of the program in the late 60's
and early 70's (both payroll tax and pension benets approximately doubled),
the payroll tax rate has remained unchanged, and ratio between average pension
benets and average per capita wages has remained almost constant. The rst
pillar is complemented by a mandatory, employer{based, fully funded pension
scheme of almost equal size, which is targeted at maintaining the previous pro-
viding retirement income beyond the basic level covered by the PAYG system.
Although the second pillar is not without controversy, most pension funds are
nancially healthy and contributions are generally viewed as a forced savings
device. Public attention clearly focuses on the nancial problems of the PAYG
system.
The main features of the rst pillar can be described as follows: Although
there is a small trust fund, the public pension system is a pay{as{you{go system,
in which the current young have to nance the pensions of the current old. The
system is nanced mainly with a proportional payroll tax, and an ear{marked
6AHV = Alters{ und Hinterbliebenen{Versicherung; AVS = Assurance Vieillesse et Sur-
vivants.
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fraction of the consumption tax (value added tax). 20% of total expenditures are
nanced out of general federal government revenues. Pension benets are paid
out after the legal retirement age J, regardless of whether the agent leaves the
workforce or not. There is a limited tax{benet linkage in Switzerland, but the
benet scheme is relatively at in reality. A majority of retirees qualify for the
maximum benet level. More important for the determination of future benets
is the number of contribution years including those granted for child care.7 As in
most other countries, the system oers some redistribution within and between
generations and insurance against various contingencies.
The 10th AHV/AVS reform, approved by the Swiss voters in 1995, led to a
number of important structural changes although the contribution rate and to-
tal expenditures remained basically unchanged. First, family/household benets
have been replaced by individual benets. Second, individuals with responsibil-
ities for children up to 16 years or other dependants are entitled to (child{)care
credits. Third, contributions during marriage, including child{care credits, are
split between the spouses. This change led to a substantial improvement for
divorced women, but reduced the entitlements of couples with a non{working
spouse and few or no children. As a fourth and most disputed change, the legal
retirement age for women was to be raised by two years, from 62 to 64 years.
2.1 The Ballot on Female Retirement Age
After the ballot on the 10th revision, a number of (mainly union and social{
democratic) groups started a popular initiative for a \10th revision without an
increase in female retirement age". The ballot was held on September 27, 1998,
and was unsuccessful. The initiative got approximately 40% of the votes. As
already pointed out and obvious from Figure 1, however, the approving vote
shares diered widely across cantons and, as shown in the summary statistics of
Table 5, across municipalities.
One important objection to investigating this particular vote is the negative
phrasing of the initiative, i.e., \YES" means \no increase in female retirement
age". Two observations mitigate this point: First, exit polls after the ballot have
shown that a large majority voters did indeed understand the question. Second,
Swiss voters are used to negative phrasing of referenda. A sizeable fraction of
federal, cantonal and municipality ballots (approximately 20{40 per year) have a
similar, if not more complicated wording.
A second diÆculty for the analysis is that the nancing of a lower retirement
age for women was not specied in the popular initiative. As a consequence
7The linkage between pre-retirement earnings and the benet level has become consider-
ably weaker in the last two decades. A large majority of (potential) beneciaries with a full
contribution period are entitled to maximum benets, so that earnings history only matters
for people with low average wages and/or contribution gaps. In 1998, for example, an average
married couple received more than 92% of maximum benets.
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the two options are nancially not equivalent, which potentially complicates the
analysis. In the last few years however, a consensus has emerged in Switzerland,
that nancial imbalances should not be nanced out of an increase in payroll
taxes, but should be covered by an earmarked increase in the value added tax.
While the focus of the analysis will be on an osetting increase in the consumption
tax rate, theoretical results for a respective increase in the payroll tax rate will
also be presented. The two options voters face are therefore:
YES = No increase in female retirement age, nanced by a higher tax rate.
NO = Increasing female retirement age by two years, leaving tax rates un-
changed.
A third diÆculty is that even if the demographic and economic structure
(including their forecasts) were publicly known, computing the degree of an o-
setting adjustment in the VAT rate or in the payroll tax rate is a diÆcult task,
and it is not obvious that people can correctly assess the costs implied in keeping
female retirement age low. Fortunately, the media presented a rough estimate
of the costs, amounting to a one percent increase in the consumption tax or a
one percent increase in the payroll tax. These estimates come close to the rates
determined by an intertemporally balanced budget rule, outlined in Appendix B.
3 Theory
Voting decisions are individual | or at most household | decisions. The rst
part of this section presents a stylized life{cycle model and discusses individual
voting behavior as a function of age, income, gender, and marital status.
Unfortunately, there are no individual data on voting behavior. As with any
aggregation the grouping of heterogeneous agents in municipalities will result
in a loss of information. To get an impression of the impact of aggregation a
simulated economy composed of fully rational life{cycle agents is constructed in
a second step. This setting also allows me to present the techniques used, and to
foreshadow the problems to be encountered in analyzing the real data.
3.1 Individual Decision Making
An individual lives a maximum of Jmax periods, facing a certain mortality risk
in every period of her life.8 In view of a given age{wage prole she adjusts her
labor supply and consumption to maximize her life{time utility, dened over
consumption c and leisure l. Optimal decisions should depend on the marital
status, its expected evolution, and the income of the spouse. While a formal
8A detailed description of the model used for the analysis and the numerical simulations of
Figures 2 and 3 can be found in Appendix B.
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model of joint household decision making is not presented here, its implications
on the empirical predictions of the theoretical model are discussed below.
Let us assume that at the time of the vote, the agent has reached a certain
age JV and a level of asset holdings aJV . She now compares the two options in
terms of remaining (optimal) life{time consumption and leisure, and opts for the
one granting her the higher implied level of utility.
The easiest way to illustrate preferences as a function of age and income is
to draw the dierence in utility at each age, measured by a consumption equiva-
lent variation. This measure translates the dierence in utility between the two
options into a percentage dierence in the possible consumption level in every
remaining period of a voters life. This strategy is used in Figures 2 and 3. In
principle, the dierence in utility also depends on the level of asset holdings and
the expected future income stream at the time of the vote. Savings in turn de-
pends on the policy the agent has expected prior to the vote. As shown in Butler
(2000), however, the asset eect is only of secondary importance when comparing
these types of policy options. The asset prole used for the graphs corresponds
to a prole consistent with a rationally anticipated increase in female retirement
age.
Positive values in Figures 2 and 3 correspond to a preference for the option
\YES = low retirement age, higher taxes". For example, a 50{year{old single
woman earning 60% of an average income will be able to consume 2.6% more
in every remaining period of her life if the retirement stays at 62. The median
voter model suggests that only the utility ranking of the two options matters in
evaluating the two alternatives (YES and NO). In reality, however, the utility
dierences between two options are small for some individuals, as is apparent
in Figures 2 and 3. In such circumstances, other factors such as ideological
preferences might be more important.
3.1.1 Age and Income Matter ...
Should the retirement age remain unchanged, all agents beyond statutory retire-
ment age will incur a consumption loss equal to the necessary increase in the
consumption tax to nance the low female retirement age. They should, there-
fore, oppose the popular initiative. Note that for single male voters with no
intention to marry later, an increase in female retirement age is always preferable
to a tax increase by an amount corresponding to the magnitude of the adjusting
tax rise. Young voters who still face a long contribution period ahead of them
are usually better o with an increase in female retirement age, as tax distortions
and especially unfavorable demographics lead to a low implicit rate of return of
the PAYG system. Municipalities with a large fraction of young people should
therefore oppose the initiative to a larger extent.
Because the benet structure in Switzerland is almost at, but contributions
are roughly proportional to income, downsizing the program benets richer in-
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dividuals. As is obvious from Figure 2, municipalities with a large fraction of
high income individuals/households are more likely to prefer a higher female re-
tirement age, i.e., to oppose the initiative. The impact of income inequality is
theoretically ambiguous: The relevant statistics for the ballot would be the frac-
tion of voters just below the income level that makes them indierent between the
two alternatives. A more unequal distribution of income can increase or decrease
this number.
3.1.2 ... so do Gender and Marital Status
Do voters take into account their (future) spouse's utility or do they only consider
their own private utility? In the former case, the expected marital status is the
more important determinant than the current one, especially for young agents.
As most people will still marry at one point in time, voting behavior of young
voters should be similar, regardless of gender and marital status. For married
couples deciding as a household entity, the utility dierences between the two
options are depicted in Figure 2 (upper panel) as a function of age and income.
Married couples should oppose the initiative when young and when old, and
oppose it during middle{age.
As people grow older the probability of single agents to marry decreases for
both sexes. We would therefore expect single middle{aged women to support and
single middle{aged men to oppose the initiative. The same is true for married
agents who predominantly care about their own private utility. Married couples
face a considerable probability of divorce (approximately 40% of all couples).
Divorcees (to be) should have similar preferences as married agents, however.
Due to the newly introduced splitting rules and common practice in divorce
suits, where the potential life{time income is taken into account for alimony
payments, the value of the dierent options for divorced agents is similar to the
one of married agents. For example, a divorced husband who is liable to support
to his ex{wife nancially, usually has to pay up to the legal retirement age. Any
increase in the latter will increase the period of support which might induce him
to support the initiative.
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Figure 2: Utility dierences (measured as a fraction of equivalent life{time con-
sumption) between an increase in female retirement and an increase in the con-
sumption tax rate  over the life{cycle for married couples (upper panel) and
single females (lower panel). The proles are drawn for dierent income trajec-
tories (in % of the average income trajectory). Positive values correspond to a
preference for an increase in female retirement age.
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Figure 3: Utility dierences (measured as a fraction of equivalent life{time con-
sumption) between an increase in female retirement and an increase in either the
consumption tax rate or the payroll tax rate. The proles are drawn for a married
couple with a 150% average income trajectory under an optimistic (upper panel)
and a pessimistic population scenario (lower panel). Positive values correspond
to a preference for an increase in the corresponding tax rate.
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3.1.3 Consumption or Payroll Tax Financing?
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of two nancing options under two polar popu-
lation and growth scenarios: The upper panel assumes a moderately optimistic
population scenario and a growth rate of 2%, the lower panel a pessimistic pop-
ulation scenario and zero growth.9 Payroll tax nancing is far more responsive
to economic and demographic conditions than consumption tax nancing. The
reason is that the payroll tax is predominantly levied on (a potentially decreas-
ing number) of younger agents, while the numerous old do not contribute. The
consumption tax, on the other hand, is spread out over all agents, including the
many old. In the stylized model, retirees are indierent between the two options
under payroll tax nancing. In reality they would weakly prefer an increase in
female retirement age, as the 20% subsidy out of general government revenues
leads to a higher income tax burden for many agents.10 For the empirical analy-
sis, the dierence between the two nancing options should thus be of secondary
importance.
3.1.4 What about Participation?
A potential selection bias may plague ballots with voluntary participation, as
voters with a large stake in the issue are more likely to participate than voters
with relatively small losses or gains.
Having said this, let me explain why I consider a potential endogeneity prob-
lem to be of secondary importance. First, it is customary in Switzerland to bunch
federal, cantonal and municipal ballots to reduce the number of voting days per
year. On the 27th of September 1998, two other equally debated federal bal-
lots (plus local issues in most cantons) on completely dierent topics were held.11
The selection bias from other ballots clearly diers from the one we are interested
in. Identical participation rates across all federal cantonal, and municipal bal-
lots in almost all municipalities show that once voters have decided to incur the
9Both scenarios are adapted from forecasts of the Swiss Federal OÆce for Statistics. The
osetting consumption tax rates amount to 0.82% and 0.91% for the optimistic and the pes-
simistic scenario, respectively. The corresponding numbers for an increase in the payroll tax
are 1.03% and 2.22%.
10Federal income taxes are a relatively small fraction of individuals' income taxes. Its struc-
ture is very progressive, and low and lower middle{income groups are basically exempt from
it.
11The rst was a change in federal law (challenged by a referendum) implying a substan-
tial increase in user fees of heavy trucks (\Bundesgesetz uber eine leistungsabhangige Schwer-
verkehrsabgabe" / \Loi federale concernant une redevance sur le trac des poids lourds liee aux
prestations"). A majority of voters favored the change. The second was a popular initiative
aiming to adjust the Swiss agricultural subsidy scheme in favor of small ecologically produc-
ing farms (\Volksinitiative fur preisgunstige Nahrungsmittel und okologische Bauernhofe" /
\Initiative populaire pour des produits alimentaires bon marche et des exploitations agricoles
ecologiques"). This popular initiative failed by a large margin.
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xed cost of voting, they participate in all ballots regardless of how much they
are aected by each referendum. Consequently, it is not possible to disentangle
participation eects of a single vote.
Second, participation patterns in Switzerland are very robust12 and do not
seem to depend much on the debated issue. It is also important to account for
institutional dierences like nes for non{participation (canton Schahausen),
the possibility of voting by mail, and dierent opening hours of polling stations.
In simple OLS regressions of the participation rate in the September 1998 federal
ballots on several explanatory variables, cantonal eects explain a large share of
the variance in participation rates. There is no evidence that the beneciaries of a
lower female retirement age have a higher participation rate. Municipalities with
a larger proportion of middle{aged females even have a lower participation rate.
Participation rates are higher for communities with an above average fraction of
self{employed and right{wing party voters, and lower for those with a higher frac-
tion of blue{collar workers, unemployed and social democrats. All these ndings
conform well with previously observed regularities of voting behavior.
3.2 Aggregation or the Dominance of Income Variables:
A Simulation Experiment
One of the major problems with real data on a municipality level is that the
joint distribution of income and age is generally not known even if the marginal
distributions are.
To illustrate this point, let us consider two hypothetical economies composed
of towns with perfectly rational married couples. The age distribution and av-
erage community income of the two articial countries are identical. In the rst
economy, inhabitants of towns are very homogenous in terms of income. Even if
there is income heterogeneity between the municipalities, demographic variables
will explain a large fraction of the voting outcome. In the second economy, half
of a municipality's couples earn nothing, and the remaining 50% earn twice the
economy's average wage. In this latter articial country, the demographic vari-
ables will be almost completely swamped by the income variable, as rich couples
oppose and poor couples support the initiative. Although the two economies
seem identical for the empirical researcher's eyes, the estimates of vote shares as
a function of demographic and income variables will look dierently. Some ad-
ditional information on the income distribution, for example the Gini coeÆcient,
or a suitable estimation strategy may mitigate this problem to some extent.
The question is how much economic insight we can expect to deduce from
municipality data when the joint distribution of age and income is not known.
To investigate this question with a realistic income distribution, 500 towns with
12Although more formal research into this question would be desirable, these regularities are
well documented in the local political science literature (see Joye (1990)).
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a between and within community income distribution closely matching that of
Switzerland are simulated. Each community is inhabited by 200 married couples
whose age is randomly chosen from the Swiss empirical age distribution. The
corresponding income for each couple is a random variable drawn from a lognor-
mal distribution around the town's average income.13 The number of couples is
chosen to be relatively small to insure a similar degree of heterogeneity in the
age structure of municipalities as in the data. In reality, dierences in the demo-
graphic structure are caused by employment opportunities, schools, and the real
estate market among other things, features I have not attempted to include in
this analysis.
From these 200 couples average income, the Gini coeÆcient, and the demo-
graphic distribution for the municipality are computed. I thus forget all the
remaining information, in particular the joint distribution of age and income.
The derived municipality statistics, which correspond to the ones observed in the
real data, are used to illustrate the estimation strategy.
The support for the initiative in the simulated economy is 46%, i.e., higher
than in reality (39%). However, this nding is not surprising given the fact that
we based the simulation on married couples only. The other polar assumption |
all agents act as if they were single | would yield a support of approximately 30{
35% (depending on the income share of women) as all men, some young women
and all elderly female voters oppose the initiative.
3.2.1 Estimation Results in a Simulated Economy
Here I apply the estimation strategy (to be explained in more details in section 4
below) to the simulated data, using only limited marginal distributions as in the
real data. The logit of the approving vote share Pi (= i for municipality i) is










Six dierent regressions are run and presented in Table 1: A1, A2, A3, and
A4 contain estimates with simplied demographics and various combinations of
demographic and income variables. A5 and A6 illustrate the impact of using
detailed demographics.
As predicted by our theoretical model, young and middle{aged voters oppose
the initiative, while middle{aged couples tend to favor it (A1{A4). The support
is larger in low{income communities and those with a higher income dispersion.
Demographic variables alone lead to a poor t of the model as specication A1
13More precisely, each couple is given a whole income prole around the chosen life{time
average income. A description of the model and the calibration parameters for the simulated
economies can be found in the Appendix B.
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shows. Once the income distribution is accounted for, however, the explanatory
power of the model depends little on the exact specication of the model.
One possibility to deal with the missing joint distribution of income and age
is to use interaction terms, age  income (A3, A4). Note the reversal of the
signs for the interactions terms depending on whether income is included as an
additional explanatory variable in the estimates.14 The use and interpretation of
interaction terms to pick up the joint distribution is therefore not innocuous.
Exploratory estimates with real data (of which the age{distribution is avail-
able in 5{year age groups) revealed that a detailed demographic structure might
be too ne a partition, especially as multicollinearity problems between, and large
dispersions within age{groups are prevalent. This preliminary nding is clearly
replicated in the simulated economy (A5). Some more structure can be gained
if demographic variables are orthogonalized (A6, details in section 4). However,
there are hardly any additional insights compared to a setting with simplied
demographics.
The most important lesson to be taken from this exercise is that even if
all agents behaved completely rationally according to the presented life{cycle
model, the demographic structure as an explanatory variable for voting behavior
is largely dominated by income eects. Due to the dominance of income, detailed
demographics might not be too informative, especially if the data had not been
orthogonalized. Nonetheless, the predicted pattern from theory remains clear
when a smaller set of demographic variables is used. It seems better to restrict
the analysis to those age{groups whose utility dierences between the two options
can be expected to be reasonably large.
14To correct for a possible non{linear of income on the voting result, I also estimated speci-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 Empirical Strategy and Data
4.1 Estimation method
A voting result in a municipality is a grouping of binary responses (\YES" and
\NO"). What we observe is the proportion Pi of ni people (i.e., the number of
voters participating in the vote) in municipality i chosing \YES". The approving
vote share is then assumed to depend on a vector of explanatory variables Xi.
The logistic model oers an easy procedure to deal with grouped data. The
approving vote share Pi is modeled as
Pi =
exp( +Xi)
1 + exp( +Xi)
: (1)







Weighted least squares regression produces the minimum chi{squared estimates of
. As the weights are functions of the unknown parameters, a two-step procedure
must be applied. Ordinary least squares in a rst step produces consistent, but
ineÆcient estimates. In the second step, the weights wi = (nii(1  i))
1=2
can
be used for weighted least squares.15
Applying standard analysis of grouped data is not without problems. Ide-
ally, individuals should be grouped according to some common characteristics,
an assumption which is clearly not satised for individuals living in dierent
communities. Fortunately qualitative results are relatively robust across esti-
mation methods, but care should be taken when interpreting standard errors or
signicance levels.
Following the predictions of our theoretical model, the logit ik of the initia-
tive's approval rate in municipality i, canton k, is a function of the demographic
composition, income distribution and possibly some other socio{economic char-
acteristics of a municipality. The base specication is






V +KK + ik; (2)
where Di is a vector of demographic variables, such as the fraction of voters in
given age  gender  marital status groups. Yi captures the income distribution
of a municipality, and the vector Si describes its socio{economic composition. The
latter includes dierent employment patterns to capture potential dierences in
the disutility of labor and risk aversion, as well as the number of children as a
proxy for altruism. The vector Pi is a vector of political parties' vote shares to
15See Amemiya (1981) and Greene (1993) for detailed descriptions of the analysis of grouped
data, and some further discussion.
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capture ideological dierences. The vector Ci contains other control variables
that should not inuence the voting decision from an economic point of view,
but have proven to be important determinants of voting decisions in the past.
These include notably language and religion. Vi is the participation rate. K is a
vector of canton dummies to capture dierences in the scal structure, degree of
direct democracy, and other important structural dierences between the Swiss
cantons. The error term ik is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0
and variance k. The vectors 
X are parameters.
A major diÆculty in the analysis is the high degree of multi{collinearity in
the explanatory variables; demographics, in particular, is everywhere. A high
average income for a municipality, for example, may be the sign of a strong eco-
nomic performance, but might as well be due to a large group of middle{aged
inhabitants at the peak of their income prole. Even the strength of political
parties has a strong demographic component. To disentangle the eects of demo-
graphic, income and other control variables, the latter two groups are regressed on
the whole demographic distribution of the municipality with a linear probability
model, i.e.,
Zi = 0 +Di
N + Zi ; (3)
where Zi 2 fYi; Si; Pi; Cig. The residuals bZi from this regression are then used
instead of Zi as explanatory variables in the specication (2).
The next problem to tackle is the choice of demographic variables. It is obvi-
ous that, for example, the fraction of males and females falling into a certain age
group are highly correlated, especially for married voters. And in municipalities
with a large fraction of middle{aged and elderly agents, the fraction of young
people has to be low. Two approaches are used in the present analysis: The
rst is using a relatively detailed set of demographic variables and orthogonalize
the data. Starting with the fraction of males of age 18{22, only the orthogo-
nal information of subsequent groups is used, i.e., the information not explained
by groups previously included in the set of explanatory variables. These trans-
formed demographic variables are denoted by cDi. The second approach is to
limit the analysis to a relatively small group of demographic variables, which are
suÆciently independent from each other. These are then denoted by fDi.
As a main specications for the analysis, I use a smaller set of demographic
variables, with and without canton xed eects, i.e.,
ik = +
fDiD + bYiY + bSiS + bPiP + bCiC + bViV +KK + ik: (4)
ik = + fDiD + bYiY + bSiS + bPiP + bCiC + bViV + ik: (5)
However, to illustrate the relevance and impact of the proposed transformations,
three combinations of transformations are also presented, together with speci-
cation (2):
ik =  +
cDiD + YiY + SiS + PiP + CiC + bViV +KK + ik; (6)
ik =  + cDiD + bYiY + bSiS + bPiP + bCiC + bViV +KK + ik: (7)
19
4.2 Data
The data for the estimates are taken from the 1990 Swiss census, with the excep-
tion of income data and political parties. A detailed description of the variables,
including summary statistics (Figure 5) and a correlation matrix (Figure 6) can
be found in Appendix A. Note that the mean for all variables is also given for
subsets of municipalities with a 80% German, French, or Italian speaking major-
ity. Already a casual inspection of these summary statistics shows that there are
no large dierences at least between the German and the French part.
As the census took place eight years before the ballot, the data set has some
limitations, especially for demographic variables. It is, however, not possible to
use other sources because of data availability. The composition of municipalities
used in the analysis is entirely based on Swiss citizens (foreigners do not have
the right to vote), with the exception of income. The relatively high fraction of
foreign residents in Switzerland, ranging from 0 to almost 50%, proves to be a big
advantage as it reduces the multi{collinearity of demographic variables to some
extent.
While socio{economic variables can be expected to be reasonably stable over
a period of eight years (they have been in the ten years before the 1990 census),
demographic composition, especially marital status, is bound to change. The de-
mographic composition in 1990 can only be taken as a proxy for the demographics
in 1998.16 Therefore, I use information about marital status only for agents age
40 and older at the time of the census. As argued in the theory section, divorced
agents should rationally make similar choices as married people. Because accord-
ing to population statistics, a majority of divorcees in the relevant age groups
were still married in 1998, this group is not directly included in the analysis. Fe-
male voters are pooled as a preliminary analysis reveals little dierence between
single and married women.
The federal tax authority reports the number of tax{payers, total net taxable
income, and tax revenues per municipality. The most recent available data is
from 1993/94. Average income is proxied by net taxable income per tax{payer.
As the distribution is schewed, the log of average income is used. The federal tax
scheme being progressive, some information about the income distribution can be
derived. I construct the Gini coeÆcient of a hypothetical bipolar income distri-
bution consistent with observed per capita net taxable income and tax revenues
(details to be found in Appendix A).
Political preferences are proxied by the vote shares of the three most important
political parties in the 1999 elections. The three parties account for roughly
16It is possible to forecast the 1998 demographic composition by means of mortality, birth,
and migration rates. As the relevant information is not available on the municipality level,
one has to use national or cantonal data. It is therefore not surprising that estimates on these
transformed data hardly dier from the estimates of the untransformed data. The results
presented are for untransformed variables.
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60% of the votes. There are considerable (historical) dierences between the
regional sections of political parties. The three chosen parties are among the
more homogeneous ones, however.
5 Estimation Results
Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the estimates for several specications. The former two
use simplied demographics, fD. Table 2 shows coeÆcients for specication (4)
with canton xed eects, and for (5) without. The model is also tted for mu-
nicipalities with a majority of German, French or Italian speakers separately in
Table 3. Table 4 uses the full demographic distribution and shows three dier-
ent transformations of the explanatory variables. Despite potential specication
problems, most results are remarkably robust.
5.1 Income and Socio{Economic Characteristics
The most striking result of the analysis is the huge importance of language com-
position on the voting outcome. A 10% increase in French speakers, for example,
increases the support for the initiative by almost two percentage points. The
result is robust even if canton xed eects take out most of the canton specic
characteristics. These ndings will be discussed in more details below. Catholic
voters seem to support the initiative more than non{Catholics (mainly protes-
tants). One explanation of this result could be that catholic people are more
concentrated in rural areas.17
Not surprisingly, higher taxable income reduces the support for a low female
retirement age considerably. The coeÆcient of income is substantially lower than
for the simulated economy despite equal average income. This is mainly due to
the fact that income eects in the real data are also picked up by other variables,
such as the fraction of self{employed, and the strength of right{wing parties.
Moreover, the shape of the income prole underlying the simulated economy
represents an average. If other income groups have a dierent prole (presumably
steeper for the rich), the relationship between current income and a rational
voting decision is changed. Such detailed information on income proles is not
available, unfortunately.
Unlike in the simulated economy, the Gini coeÆcient has a negative sign in
most regressions. It seems as if in municipalities with more income inequality,
fewer people benet from a low female retirement age. One possible explanation
is that more people with low taxable incomes in these communities live on capital
17I did not include a variable for rural and urban areas, as the available data is very unsat-
isfactory. It is basically based on community size: Some municipalities within a 5 miles radius
of a major city center are often indicated as rural. Canton xed eects may pick up some part
of this information.
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income, which is taxed very lightly in Switzerland. An increase in the consump-
tion tax rate might harm them more than a postponed claim to a relatively low
retirement benet. An alternative reason for this nding might be that the tax
data is collected for the whole population, while voters are of Swiss nationality.
Municipalities with a large foreign population might display a relatively high in-
come dispersion and a low average taxable income, but a much higher average
income for Swiss citizens.18 In both cases, a high Gini coeÆcient may point to
the fact that income has been underestimated.
Communities with a high fraction of self{employed oppose the initiative sig-
nicantly more. The reverse is true for those with a high fraction of blue{collar
worker. These ndings are not surprising either, self{employed agents have pre-
sumably a lower degree of risk aversion, a lower disutility of labor, and, as Alesina
& La Ferrara (2000) have found for the US, a higher aversion to redistribution.
The negative coeÆcient of unemployed people in most regressions should be in-
terpreted with care. Unlike other explanatory variables, the unemployment rate
has changed considerably between 1990 and 1998, from under one percent to al-
most 5 percent. Nonetheless, regions with an above average unemployment in
1990 were also the ones with an larger rate eight years later. One interpretation
of the negative sign would be that unemployed people (and those more prone to
be unemployed) would prefer a shift in government transfers from the pension
system to a more generous unemployment insurance.
The number of children, which can be interpreted as a proxy for altruistic
attitudes, has a strongly signicant negative coeÆcient. Due to a very low implicit
rate of return of the PAYG system, children should rationally choose a higher
female retirement age, had they been allowed to participate in the vote. Although
they had not, their interests were apparently well represented.
The fraction of housewives, taken as a proxy for family structure, has a pos-
itive sign and is signicant in some of the estimates. Due to child{care credits
and contribution splitting, housewives can claim benets when they reach the
statutory retirement age. Everything else equal, more traditional municipalities
with a larger fraction of stay{home wives should therefore not necessarily vote
dierently from more modern communities. The sign for housewives in the French
speaking communities is negative. This could mean that women stay home in
more auent households, or that the fraction of housewives is closely related to
the eect of more children as mentioned above.
Participation has a negative sign, but is only signicant in a regression of
German speaking regions. The negative sign could be the result of participation
picking up some variation in demographics. Men in general, and middle{aged men
in particular usually have an increased participation regardless of the type of the
ballot. Due to higher mortality rates, men are somewhat underrepresented in the
18The foreign population is overrepresented in both the lowest and the highest income brack-
ets.
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simplied demographic variables. The participation rate may have corrected this
eect.
5.2 Gender and Age Dierences
Theoretical model predicts that municipalities with a large fraction of young
agents of both sexes are more likely to oppose the initiative, i.e., to support
a higher female retirement age. While this is clearly true for young men, the
evidence is mixed for young women. There is some evidence that very young
women (age 18{22) support a higher female retirement age (D2, D3 in Table 4),
as well as young women (age 18{27) in the German speaking part (L1 in Table 3).
The former two groups are in fact the only female voters to support postponing
retirement. Even women beyond the proposed higher age oppose the increase,
though this nding is not completely robust to specication, as Table 4 shows.
A possible explanation for this nding is that elderly females take an increase
in female retirement age as a signal for future pension cuts which might aect
them later. Alternatively, unlike most men who are cared for by their wives in
old age, old females rely more heavily on their children for social contacts. They
may want, therefore, their daughters({in{law) to be able to retire earlier.
The remarkable support of a higher female retirement age by (married) men
is an indication that voters act as individuals to some extent, and not primarily
as household members with negatively aected spouses. The opposition against
the initiative may still contain an income element despite the transformations, as
married men tend to have higher income than both women and single men. Esti-
mation B3 with interaction terms, however, casts some doubt on this hypothesis.
More importantly, men are covered to a much larger extent by employer pension
plans (which also oer generous insurance for surviving spouses). Nonetheless,
married women should take this into account as well and act accordingly, if their
preferences were similar. An obvious explanation for the discrepancy would be
a gender dierence in the preference for redistribution, as had been nicely docu-
mented in Boeri et al. (2001) and Alesina & La Ferrara (2000).
5.3 Ideology Matters!
After the ballot the media reported the results as strong evidence for ideological
decision making. Although this claim seems exaggerated given the empirical evi-
dence, political preferences have played a substantial role. This nding is clearly
at variance with the questionnaire study of in Boeri et al. (2001) which nds that
political preferences are virtually unimportant. One possible explanation for the
discrepancy might be that voters and interviewees may not only care about the
contents of a reform, but also about who proposed the reform. In that case, some
of the importance of political parties in the analyzed referendum might come
from the fact that the initiative originated in left{wing groups.
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Municipalities with a larger share of social{democrat voters strongly support
the initiative, while those with a higher fraction of right{liberal voters strongly
oppose it, everything else equal. A larger share of christian{democrat voters is
associated with a stronger support in German speaking regions and with a lower
support in French and Italian speaking regions. In the latter two, the christian{
democrats are relatively more right{wing than in the German speaking part.
5.4 Do French and Italian Speakers decide Dierently?
That language composition plays a large role is undisputed. Two interesting
questions arise from this nding. First, does language capture some other features
of the dierent regions that has mistakenly been ignored in the specication? And
second, do regions also display dierent voting behavior along other dimensions,
i.e., do separate estimates for language regions dier?
The rst question can probably be answered in the negative. It is hard to
think of any economic characteristics not included in the analysis apart from
one important dierence that is unfortunately not reected in the data: Recent
economic downturns tended to be more severe in Latin regions than in the Ger-
man speaking part.19 One shortcoming of the data is the outdated information
of unemployment. But as argued before, unemployment in 1998 was correlated
with unemployment in 1990. Indeed, communities with a high unemployment
rate were predominantly located in the Latin parts even in 1990. Dierences be-
tween the German and French part are minor in terms of income, socio{economic
preferences, strength of political parties, and demographics. The Italian part is
dierent, but so is its voting behavior. A much smaller fraction of the munici-
pality variation can be explained there.
The French and German part display a similar voting pattern. Political pref-
erences are somewhat more important in the French part, while the fraction of
children is unimportant in the latter (it could have been picked up by the frac-
tion of housewives). Young women in the German speaking part seem to prefer
a higher female retirement age, while their counterparts in the French part are
indierent. With voting patterns so similar for the two language regions, what
does explain the dierence in outcome? Again, as with gender dierence, there
might be a potentially higher support for redistribution (higher risk{aversion?)
in certain regions. The French part and its press, moreover, closely monitor the
social and economic developments in neighboring France where working hours
and contribution years are much shorter. While the same is true for Germany,
the aÆnity between the German speaking part and Germany is much lower. Be-
cause the German speaking part is also largest and economically most powerful
part, it is much more self content than minority regions.
19The depths of recessions might also be an endogenous phenomenon to a certain extent,
reecting dierences in preferences, in particular a much larger | and better accepted |
government in the French speaking part.
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6 Conclusions
The empirical analysis of the plebiscite on female retirement age delivers some
interesting results. In general, the impact of income and age are as expected from
theory. While gender dierences for young agents are relatively small, middle{
aged and elderly female voters oppose pension cuts much more than men, even
when they are not directly aected anymore. Richer municipalities and those
with a large share of self{employed, children, or right{wing voters are more likely
to favor an increase in female retirement age. Our estimations of the referendum
also show the importance of socio{economic variables which are not typically
considered by economic analysis. In particular, language turns out to be highly
signicant in all cases, even after controlling for measures of economic perfor-
mance and demographics.
It is obvious that the result from a referendum on a general increase in re-
tirement age would look dierently from a referendum on an increase in female
retirement age. The strong support of a higher female retirement age by married
men might be a signal that some (male) voters might be against an increase in
contribution rates, at the expense of postponing legal retirement age. In addition,
in some countries, middle{ and high{income earners are relatively well covered by
fully funded pension plans and private savings, which makes them less vulnerable
to cuts in the PAYG system.
Given the unfavorable demographics in almost all industrialized countries,
the number of retired voters will grow considerably over the next few decades.
The voting behavior of the elderly will thus be a crucial factor in future pension
reforms. In theory, these voters should be better o with lower taxes and a later
retirement. However, if they take any proposed increase in retirement age as a
signal for future cuts, as elderly women might have done in 1998, they might
oppose the reform after all. If the government can credibly commit to strictly
grandfathering the pensioners, the political feasibility of increasing retirement
age will | unlike other reform options | not diminish in the future.
Changes in retirement age have other attractive features which may give them
an advantage over other policy options: First, grandfathering of elderly individu-
als after the reform is easy, and the transition periods can be kept short. Second,
instead of uniformly cutting the benet level, the elderly get a suÆcient pension
when they are least capable of supplementing their income. Third, retirement
age can be linked to life{expectancy in a straight{forward way. One draw back
of such a policy is that mortality dierences across income{groups may favor the
rich. But this problem could be circumvented by making retirement conditional
on the number of working years and not on age, or by subsidizing early retirement
of low{income workers with a long working history.
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B1 B2 B3
Variable all all all
Participation .124 (.071) -.113 (.076) -.107 (.076)
French .612 (.016) ** .315 (.025) ** .316 (.025) **
Italian .824 (.034) ** -.168 (.064) ** -.166 (.064) **
Catholic .081 (.034) * .105 (.043) * .112 (.043) **
Taxable Income (log) -.619 (.036) ** -.443 (.033) ** -.477 (.290)
Gini coeÆcient -1.02 (.118) ** -.702 (.101) ** -.705 (.101) **
Unemployed 5.46 (1.51) ** -2.97 (1.35) * -2.88 (1.34) *
Self{Employed -3.58 (.291) ** -2.48 (.254) ** -2.33 (.257) **
Housewife .328 (.383) .649 (.342) .802 (.345) *
Blue{Collar .813 (.277) ** 1.67 (.241) ** 1.65 (.242) **
Children age 8{14 -3.78 (.491) ** -3.59 (.409) ** -3.54 (.416) **
Social{democrat .898 (.055) ** 1.85 (.074) ** 1.83 (.074) **
Right{liberal -.090 (.048) -.236 (.062) ** -.250 (.063) **
Christian{democrat .310 (.058) ** .524 (.069) ** .528 (.068) **
Young male -3.06 (.477) ** -2.69 (.389) ** -2.83 (.393) **
Young female 1.53 (.509) ** -.445 (.423) -.507 (.424)
Middle male married -6.67 (.663) ** -2.74 (.574) ** -2.69 (.573) **
Middle male single 3.98 (1.42) ** -1.39 (1.18) -1.17 (1.21)
Middle female 11.38 (.468) ** 3.73 (.474) ** 3.91 (.479) **
Old male married -4.66 (.509) ** -2.86 (.442) ** -2.91 (.462) **
Old male single -3.70 (.849) ** -4.50 (.695) ** -5.14 (.744) **
Old female 4.12 (.243) ** 1.34 (.249) ** 1.53 (.262) **
MYOUNG  TAXIN 2.82 (1.87)
FYOUNG  TAXIN -1.27 (2.29)
MMMID  TAXIN 5.71 (3.05)
MSMID  TAXIN 10.85 (6.07)
FMID  TAXIN -6.77 (1.98) **
MMOLD  TAXIN 2.95 (2.04)
MSOLD  TAXIN 5.34 (3.31)
FOLD  TAXIN -1.48 (1.09)
Canton xed eect NO YES YES
Observations 2825 2825 2825
Adjusted R2 .7354 .8344 .8359
Table 2: Estimated parameters (grouped logit model), simplied demographics, all
regions. Standard errors are in parenthesis; * and ** denote statistical signi-
cance at the 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
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L1 L2 L3
Variable german  0:8 french  0:8 italian  0:8
Participation -.264 (.094) ** .062 (.145) -.280 (.288)
Catholic .134 (.050) ** .419 (.107) ** .349 (.282)
Taxable Income (log) -.473 (.044) ** -.602 (.052) ** -.687 (.181) **
Gini coeÆcient -.297 (.156) -.918 (.142) ** .201 (.457)
Unemployed -3.78 (1.97) 1.33 (1.92) .202 (5.03)
Self{Employed -2.67 (.333) ** -2.61 (.434) ** -4.29 (1.28) **
Housewife .180 (.433) -1.38 (.593) * -1.88 (1.71)
Blue{Collar 1.28 (.298) ** 1.77 (.419) ** -.444 (1.22)
Children age 8{14 -4.12 (.534) ** .732 (.735) -.377 (2.10)
Social{democrat 1.79 (.095) ** .752 (.150) ** -.276 (.433)
Right{liberal -.102 (.085) -.600 (.110) ** -.934 (.331) **
Christian{democrat .282 (.094) ** -.572 (.143) ** -.522 (.313)
Young male -3.11 (.497) ** -2.00 (.657) ** 1.20 (1.99)
Young female -2.21 (.545) ** .223 (.698) -2.43 (2.59)
Middle male married -.235 (.745) -4.28 (1.00) ** -.113 (3.62)
Middle male single 1.31 (1.53) -4.14 (2.02) * .210 (1.93)
Middle female 3.88 (.548) ** 2.19 (.720) ** -6.55 (1.96) **
Old male married -4.14 (.539) ** -3.93 (.780) ** -2.32 (2.51)
Old male single -5.78 (.918) ** -3.94 (1.25) ** .454 (.845)
Old female 2.43 (.258) ** 1.21 (.353) ** 2.36 (.251) **
Canton xed eect YES YES YES
Observations 1558 852 203
Adjusted R2 .7732 .7180 .3617
Table 3: Estimated parameters (grouped logit model), simplied demographics,
language regions. Standard errors are in parenthesis; * and ** denote statistical
signicance at the 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
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D1 D2 D3
transformed no/no = (2) yes/no = (6) yes/yes = (7)
Variable
Participation -.138 (.075) -.138 (.075) -.138 (.075)
French .313 (.026) ** .313 (.026) ** .313 (.026) **
Italian .166 (.079) * .166 (.079) * .166 (.079) *
Catholic .118 (.043) ** .118 (.043) ** .118 (.043) **
Taxable Income -.436 (.032) ** -.436 (.032) ** -.436 (.032) **
Income Distribution -.594 (.100) ** -.594 (.100) ** -.594 (.100) **
Unemployed -2.95 (1.33) * -2.95 (1.33) * -2.95 (1.33) *
Self{Employed -2.50 (.255) ** -2.50 (.255) ** -2.50 (.255) **
Housewife 1.11 (.341) ** 1.11 (.341) ** 1.11 (.341) **
Blue{Collar 1.71 (.239) ** 1.71 (.239) ** 1.71 (.239) **
Children under 10 -4.81 (.773) ** -4.81 (.773) ** -4.81 (.773) **
Social{democrat 1.77 (.074) ** 1.77 (.074) ** 1.77 (.074) **
Right{liberal -.195 (.062) ** -.195 (.062) ** -.195 (.062) **
Christian{democrat .542 (.069) ** .542 (.069) ** .542 (.069) **
18{22 male -1.24 (.762) -3.64 (.809) ** -5.42 (.629) **
18{22 female -.614 (.760) -1.72 (.807) ** -2.05 (.633) **
23{27 male -4.64 (.915) ** -1.30 (.666) -1.25 (.524) *
23{27 female -4.60 (.911) ** .891 (.664) 1.62 (.544) **
28{32 male -3.97 (.955) ** .372 (.652) -.664 (.570)
28{32 female -5.82 (.955) ** 1.55 (.646) * 1.93 (.577) **
33{37 male -2.85 (1.00) ** -2.68 (1.00) ** -3.94 (.822) **
33{37 female -2.77 (1.02) ** -1.50 (1.03) -1.07 (.717)
38{42 male -3.13 (1.06) ** .111 (.814) -.575 (.660)
38{42 female -1.31 (1.11) 1.70 (.988) .986 (.641)
43{47 male -2.92 (1.05) ** -1.24 (.877) -.627 (.682)
43{47 female .561 (1.14) 5.50 (.872) ** 4.92 (.653) **
48{52 male single -4.03 (1.86) * 2.01 (1.75) .757 (1.69)
48{52 male married -5.25 (1.12) ** -4.76 (.982) ** -3.38 (.802) **
48{52 female .172 (1.13) 4.81 (.791) ** 4.37 (.662) **
53{57 male single -8.44 (2.33) ** -2.47 (2.16) -1.80 (2.10)
53{57 male married -3.57 (1.13) ** -3.27 (.994) ** -3.27 (.994) **
53{57 female -.295 (1.16) 2.64 (.832) ** 2.42 (.727) **
58{62 male single -5.62 (2.50) * -1.18 (2.43) -2.27 (2.32)
58{62 male married -1.58 (1.23) -1.02 (1.09) .247 (.917)
58{62 female -3.56 (1.19) ** 2.52 (.944) ** 1.48 (.811)
63{67 male single -7.04 (2.48) ** .218 (2.37) -.721 (2.28)
63{67 male married -3.36 (1.25) ** -3.78 (1.13) ** -1.46 (.937)
63{67 female -3.14 (1.19) ** 3.86 (.939) ** 2.85 (.838) **
68{72 male single -7.25 (2.48) ** -5.42 (2.41) * -4.74 (2.41) *
68{72 male married -4.82 (1.25) ** -4.62 (1.17) ** -2.87 (1.01) **
68{72 female -2.88 (1.16) * 4.89 (.950) ** 4.36 (.869) **
73{77 male single -3.74 (2.56) 1.95 (2.49) 2.23 (2.38)
73{77 male married -4.31 (1.28) ** -2.85 (1.18) * -1.45 (1.05)
73{77 female -2.50 (1.13) 2.82 (.904) ** 2.22 (.888) **
78+ male single -4.83 (1.55) ** -3.19 (1.37) * -1.70 (1.35)
78+ male married -5.07 (1.05) ** -4.71 (.863) ** -4.37 (.882) **
78+ female -3.88 (.872) ** 1.42 (.474) ** 1.42 (.474) **
Canton xed eect YES YES YES
Adj. R2 (Obs.) 0.8412 (2825) 0.8412 (2825) 0.8412 (2825)
Table 4: Estimated parameters (grouped logit model) with full demographic distri-
bution. Transformations are as explained in text. Standard errors are in paren-
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A Date description
All data are from the Swiss Federal OÆce of Statistics (Schweizerisches Bundesamt fur
Statistik). Summary statistics (unweighted) and a correlation matrix can be found in
Tables 5 and 6, respectively. The variables are dened as follows (sources in parenthe-
sis):
YES = approving vote share initiative: YES{votes divided by valid votes.
PART = participation rate: Number of votes divided by registered voters (= all
Swiss citizens age 18 and older).
GER = German speaking: fraction of Swiss citizens with German mother tongue
(census 1990).
FRA / ITA: same as GER for French and Italian.
KATH = Roman catholic: fraction of Swiss citizens belonging to the Roman catholic
church (census 1990).
TAXIN = taxable income: Taxable income per tax{payer in 1'000 Sfr. (federal tax
oÆce period 1993/1994).
TAXREV = tax revenues: Federal tax revenues per tax{payer.
GINI = Gini coeÆcient: Gini coeÆcient constructed from TAXREV, TAXIN, and
the federal income tax schedule of 1993/1994. Assumption: a fraction  of a
municipality earns a low income max(TAXREV   a; 0), (1   ) a high income
TAXREV+ 
1 a. The parameter a is chosen to yield a per capita tax revenue




The results are fairly robust to the choice of . For the simulations  = 2=3 was
chosen.
UNEMP = unemployment rate: number of unemployed Swiss citizens divided by
all 15{65 year old Swiss citizens (census 1990). More standard denitions of
unemployment do not change the results.
SELF = Self{employed: fraction of self{employed among all 15{65 year old Swiss
citizens (census 1990).
HOUSE = Housewife/man: dito.
WORK = Blue{collar worker: qualied and unqualied worker, same denition
and source as SELF.
CHILD = Children age 8{15: measured by fraction of children age 0{7 in the 1990
census.
SPS = social{democrats: measured as the vote share of the Swiss Social Demo-
cratic party at the 1999 election of the Swiss parliament.
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FDP = right{liberals: dito, for Liberal Democratic Party.
CVP = christian{democrats: dito, for the Christian Democratic Party, which is
approximately at the center of the political spectrum between SPS and FDP.
Demographic variables: measured as a fraction of total voting population (i.e., age
18 and above in 1998, corresponding to age 10 and above in 1990). 5{year age
groups under 40 (48 in 1998) are broken into age  gender, those above 48 into
age  gender times marital status. As the marital status of women turned out to
be relatively unimportant, single and married females were pooled. As mentioned
in the main text, all estimation results are reported without any adjustments.
Simplied demographics uses the following age groups:
 Young: age 18{27 at the time of the vote, 10{19 in the 1990 census.
 Middle{aged: age 53{62 at the time of the vote, 45{54 in the 1990 census.
 Old: age 68+ at the time of the vote, 60+ in the 1990 census.
B The Theoretical Model
The macroeconomic environment is kept simple. A small open economy is analyzed, in
which factor prices, wage rate w() and real interest rate r(), are exogenous. There is
no wedge between borrowing and lending rates, and agents can lend and borrow freely
at the relevant interest rate until they reach the oÆcial retirement age. Retirement is
assumed to be induced by the age{wage prole and is therefore voluntary.
Agents live a maximum of Jmax periods and are indexed by their age j and gender
. In every period, individuals face a certain mortality risk 1  j;, where  j; denotes
the probability of being alive in period j, conditional on having been alive in period
j   1. The unconditional probability of surviving until period j can then be calculated
as 	j; =
Qj
i=1  i; . Note that | as discussed in the main part of the paper | this
agent represents an \average" (per generation) across income groups.
B.1 The government and the public pension system
The government provides a pay{as{you{go (PAYG) public pension system, in which
the current young have to nance the pensions of the current old. Pension benets B
are paid out after the legal retirement age J, regardless of whether the agent leaves
the workforce or not. We also assume that future benets depend on contribution years
y (including child{care credits), but not on the amount of payroll taxes paid during
working years (with a maximum of ymax working years):
Bj =
(




; j  J
(8)
31
The public pension system part is nanced by a proportional payroll tax  and a pro-
portional consumption tax  on all consumption expenditures.20 The pension system's
intertemporal budget constraint can therefore be written as (gender index dropped for




















where !j(t) and cj(t) denote labor income and consumption expenditures, respectively,
of an age{j{individual at time t, and D(t0) is the pension system's initial wealth.
B.2 Individual decision making
Preferences are time separable and the instantaneous utility function U [] depends on
consumption c and leisure 0  l  1. Let S = fJ fem; ; g be the set of reform policies,
and let variables marked with superscript s 2 S depend on the chosen policy. An agent
at age with assets AfJV  1g from the previous period maximizes her remaining lifetime
utility,









Income opportunities are non{stochastic and known. Let ej; denote age{j labor pro-
ductivity, and w the constant real wage rate per eÆciency unit of labor. The budget
constraints of an individual can then be written as
(a0 = 0)
aJV  1 = AfJV  1g
aj = (1 + r)aj 1 + (1  lj) ejw (1  
s) +Bsj   cj (11)
aJmax  0
where aj are the end{of{period asset holdings of an age{j{individual.
B.3 Welfare comparisons and voting
Welfare dierences between two reforms are quantied by a consumption equivalent
variation measure. By how much does one have to increase/reduce an individual's
consumption (keeping leisure constant) in all future periods for reform s1 to equalize





AfJV  1gi = Us1 h(1  )cs1 ; ls1
AfJV  1gi ;
20In Switzerland, a fraction 0:2 of aggregate pension benets is nanced by general govern-
ment revenues. In order to simplify the analysis, we approximate this implicit government
subsidy by an adjustment in the payroll tax rate.
32
where cs1;s2 and ls1;s2 denote optimal consumption and leisure paths, respectively, for
an age{JV agent after reforms s1 and s2 . The measure  depends on an individ-
ual's age and asset holdings. If instantaneous utility is specialized to the constant{
intertemporal{elasticity{of{substitution (CIES) case, the percentage in consumption






: It is assumed
that all reforms are nal. The rational individual votes for the option granting her a
higher remaining life{time utility as measured by .
B.4 Simulation and Calibration
B.4.1 Benchmark Model
Population forecasts until the year 2040, including mortality rates, were taken from
(SBfS). Population forecasts after the year 2040 were obtained by keeping fertility,
mortality and immigration rates constant thereafter. The exogenous rates of growth
for an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario are 2 and 0 precent, respectively. The real
interest rate r used for the simulation was 3%, though the main results are insensitive
to the choice of r.
The benet level is assumed to be linked to the average current wage rate. Cali-
bration of parameters follows standard macro{economic practice (the presented results
are not sensitive to parameter choices): The constant intertemporal elasticity of substi-





1  is used with  = 4, and  = 0:33. The pure
discount rate is  = 1:011 per annum. Average labor earnings proles ej are computed
from data collected by the SBfS.
The individual optimization problem is solved numerically. Fiscal parameters and
individual decisions have to be jointly determined. The former are determined by the
intertemporally balanced budget rule (9), with the additional requirement the propor-
tionality between benets and average income remains constant. The baseline case is
the NO option, i.e., the higher female retirement age. In the case of YES, the osetting
tax rates are the additional consumption or payroll tax rate necessary to nance the
lower female retirement age.
B.4.2 The Articial Economy
500 communities with 200 married couples are simulated. Each couple is assigned an
age, an income prole, and asset holdings consistent with age and income. The age
is chosen randomly from the Swiss empirical age distribution in 1995 (per 5{year age
group), interpolated to 1998 with a recent population forecast for 2000. The corre-
sponding income prole for each couple is a random variable drawn from a lognormal
distribution around the town's average income, which in turn is drawn from a lognormal
distribution matching the Swiss between community income distribution. The within
town standard deviation is chosen to approximately match the distribution of the Gini
coeÆcient.
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